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Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
  2. Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
  3. Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning More by Doing Less," Working Papers 2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  4. Ganuza Juan-Jose & Gomez Fernando, 2006. "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 365-397, January.
  5. Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 105-133, January.
  6. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
  7. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2009. "Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2193-2208, December.
  8. James R. Brennan & Joel Watson, 2013. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, July.
  9. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  10. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational lobbying and campaign finance reform when contributions buy access," Working Papers 2010-22, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  11. Joel Watson, 2007. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
  12. Faure-Grimaud Antoine & Laffont Jean-Jacques & Martimort David, 2003. "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, January.
  13. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2008. "Rules of proof, courts, and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 20-40, March.
  14. Jesse Bull, 2012. "Third-Party Budget Breakers and Side Contracting in Team Production," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2606-2614.
  15. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  16. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," Papers 1908.05556, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  17. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_124, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  18. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2011. "Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforcement," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 323-371.
  19. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
  20. Mathis, Jérôme, 2008. "Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 571-584, November.
  21. Jean-Jacques Laffont & François Salanié, 2006. "Incentives and the Search for Unknown Resources Such as Water," Natural Resource Management and Policy, in: Renan-Ulrich Goetz & Dolors Berga (ed.), Frontiers in Water Resource Economics, chapter 0, pages 21-41, Springer.
  22. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2014. "Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption," Working Papers halshs-00922092, HAL.
  23. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  24. Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
  25. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
  26. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  27. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
  28. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  29. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  30. Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 109-128, July.
  31. Aurélie Slechten, 2020. "Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
  32. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2017. "Certification and Market Transparency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1842-1868.
  33. Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Competition for Access and Full Revelation of Evidence," Working Papers 2010-12, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  34. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
  35. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2015. "The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-39.
  36. Miyazawa, Shinjiro, 2012. "Optimal borrowing structure: An explanation for the multiplicity of large-share creditors and the differentiation among them," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 434-453.
  37. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Evidence Revelation in Competitions for Access," Working Papers 2010-21, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  38. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  39. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
  40. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  41. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  42. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
  43. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
  44. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, "undated". "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  45. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2016. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 741-767, October.
  46. Surajeet Chakravarty & Miltiadis Makris, 2012. "Designing Incentives under Multidimensional Performance Measures," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 687-711, December.
  47. Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Disclosure Risk and Price Drift," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 351-379, May.
  48. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  49. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  50. Cotton, Christopher, 2009. "Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
  51. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
  52. Cotton, Christopher, 2012. "Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 369-386.
  53. Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  54. Chris William Sanchirico, 2008. "A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 273-313, January.
  55. Joshua S. Gans, 2019. "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  56. Jesse Bull, 2009. "Costly Evidence And Systems Of Fact‐Finding," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 103-125, April.
  57. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
  58. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
  59. ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  60. Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
  61. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  62. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
  63. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
  64. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter, 2021. "Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2021/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  65. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 904, Barcelona School of Economics.
  66. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt63s1s3j6, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  67. Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
  68. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.
  69. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2014. "Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption," PSE Working Papers halshs-00922092, HAL.
  70. Hideshi Itoh, 2023. "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 333-354, July.
  71. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Access Fees in Politics," Working Papers 0903, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  72. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
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