Learning more by doing less
Self-interested agents (e.g., interest groups, researchers) produce verifiable evidence in an attempt to convince a principal (e.g., legislator, funding organization) to act on their behalf (e.g., introduce legislation, fund research). Agents provide less informative evidence than the principal prefers since doing so maximizes the probability the principal acts in their favor. If the principal faces budget or other constraints that limit the number of agents whose proposals she can support, then agents produce more-accurate evidence as they compete for priority. Under reasonable conditions, the principal is better off when her capacity to act is limited.
|Date of creation:||11 Oct 2011|
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6094, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Nov 2007.
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- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009.
NBER Working Papers
15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iatr74eao is not listed on IDEAS
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- Christopher Cotton, 2008.
"Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access,"
0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2009. "Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2000.
"Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
qt6th0060j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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