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Imperfect evaluation in project screening

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  • Andrei Barbos

Abstract

This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent’s, but also the evaluator’s assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specification, an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator’s acceptance policy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Barbos, 2014. "Imperfect evaluation in project screening," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 31-46, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:112:y:2014:i:1:p:31-46
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-013-0334-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barbos, Andrei, 2013. "Project screening with tiered evaluation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 293-306.
    2. Ofer H. Azar, 2007. "The Slowdown In First‐Response Times Of Economics Journals: Can It Be Beneficial?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 179-187, January.
    3. Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning More by Doing Less," Working Papers 2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    4. Derek Leslie, 2005. "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 407-413, March.
    5. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2010. "“Tell me what you need”: signaling with limited resources," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 1-28, February.
    6. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Submission Fees and Response Times in Academic Publishing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 501-509, February.
    7. Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sascha Baghestanian & Sergey V. Popov, 2018. "On publication, refereeing and working hard," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1419-1459, November.
    2. Barbos, Andrei, 2013. "Project screening with tiered evaluation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 293-306.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluation; Project screening; Regulatory burden; D02; D82; L50;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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