Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening
This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specifcation, an increase in the submis- sion fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in Journal of Economics|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Derek Leslie, 2005. "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 407-413, March.
- Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Submission Fees and Response Times in Academic Publishing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 501-509, February.
- Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011.
"Learning More by Doing Less,"
2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
- Andrei Barbos, 2013.
"Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation,"
0913, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
- Ofer H. Azar, 2007.
"The Slowdown In First-Response Times Of Economics Journals: Can It Be Beneficial?,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 179-187, 01.
- Azar, Ofer H., 2002. "The slowdown in first-response times of economics journals: Can it be beneficial?," MPRA Paper 4478, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2010. "“Tell me what you need”: signaling with limited resources," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 1-28, February.
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