Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening
This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specifcation, an increase in the submis- sion fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in Journal of Economics|
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References listed on IDEAS
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