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Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation

  • Barbos, Andrei

We study a Bayesian game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent, who owns a project of unknown quality, considers proposing it to an evaluator, who has the choice of whether or not to accept it. There exist two distinct tiers of evaluation that differ in the benefits they deliver to the agent upon acceptance of a project. The agent has to select the tier to which the project is submitted for review. Making a proposal incurs a cost on the agent in the form of a submission fee. We examine the effect of a change in the submission fees at the two tiers of evaluation on the expected quality of projects that are implemented by the evaluator.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40848.

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Date of creation: 14 Aug 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40848
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  1. Azar, Ofer H., 2002. "The slowdown in first-response times of economics journals: Can it be beneficial?," MPRA Paper 4478, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2012. "The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1247-1260.
  3. Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
  4. Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2008. "Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency," NBER Working Papers 14457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning More by Doing Less," Working Papers 2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  6. Barbos, Andrei, 2012. "Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening," MPRA Paper 40847, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Submission Fees and Response Times in Academic Publishing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 501-09, February.
  8. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
  9. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2006. "A Model of Forum Shopping," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1091-1113, September.
  10. Derek Leslie, 2005. "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 407-413, March.
  11. Heintzelman Martin & Nocetti Diego, 2009. "Where Should we Submit our Manuscript? An Analysis of Journal Submission Strategies," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, September.
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