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Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening


  • Barbos, Andrei


This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who decides whether or not to accept it. First, we show that there exist instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards. Second, we show that an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbos, Andrei, 2012. "Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening," MPRA Paper 40847, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40847

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Barbos, Andrei, 2013. "Project screening with tiered evaluation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 293-306.
    2. Ofer H. Azar, 2007. "The Slowdown In First-Response Times Of Economics Journals: Can It Be Beneficial?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 179-187, January.
    3. Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning More by Doing Less," Working Papers 2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    4. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Submission Fees and Response Times in Academic Publishing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 501-509, February.
    5. Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
    6. Derek Leslie, 2005. "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 407-413, March.
    7. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2010. "“Tell me what you need”: signaling with limited resources," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 1-28, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barbos, Andrei, 2013. "Project screening with tiered evaluation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 293-306.
    2. Sascha Baghestanian & Sergey V. Popov, 2014. "On Publication, Refereeing, and Working Hard," Economics Working Papers 14-04, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.

    More about this item


    Evaluation; Project Screening; Regulatory Burden;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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