IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Allocating Access for Information and Contributions

  • Austen-Smith, David
Registered author(s):

    Legislators value both campaign contributions and policy-relevant information interest groups might offer through lobbying. At the same time, there is some evidence that legislators are price setters to the extent that access to an incumbent legislator is conditional in part on making some level of campaign contribution. In this article, I consider a legislator's trade-off between granting access for informational reasons and granting access for contributions. Legislative influence in the model is exclusively through the provision of decision-relevant information, and money is used exclusively to seek access; in particular, groups cannot make contributions in exchange for policy decisions. The focus of the analysis is on the implications of the legislator's price setting on the induced pattern of demand for access and the consequences for the informational quality of subsequent legislative decisions. Moreover, although lobbyists are permitted to choose their informational source strategically, there is no possibility of dissembling when making an argument for one policy decision over another. The analysis yields both empirical predictions on the frequency and character of induced lobbying by different types of agents and provides some qualified support for limiting campaign contributions. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

    Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 277-303

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:277-303
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
    Fax: 01865 267 985
    Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
    Email:

    Order Information: Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:277-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)

    or (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.