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Medical Screening and Award Errors in Disability Insurance

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  • Liebert, Helge

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of medical screening on individual disability insurance benefit receipt. Using a unique policy change in Switzerland, I assess the size of award errors in disability insurance and show that improvements in medical screening can substantially reduce insurance inflow. In the absence of explicit medical screening, wrongful admissions dominate rejection errors and account for at least 14% of insurance inflow. Misclassification is tied to difficult-to-diagnose conditions, indicating inaccurate assessments by general practitioners. Reductions in full pension benefit awards are potentially substituted in part by increases in partial benefit awards.

Suggested Citation

  • Liebert, Helge, 2015. "Medical Screening and Award Errors in Disability Insurance," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113224, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113224
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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