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Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Mathilde Godard

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - Groupe ENSAE-ENSAI - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - Groupe ENSAE-ENSAI - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Legos - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Pierre Koning
  • Martin Lindeboom

Abstract

We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic "Gatekeeper Protocol" increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals' ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathilde Godard & Pierre Koning & Martin Lindeboom, 2022. "Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance," Post-Print hal-03689792, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03689792
    DOI: 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
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    Cited by:

    1. Koning, Pierre & Muller, Paul & Prudon, Roger, 2025. "Why does temporary work increase disability insurance inflow?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    2. Krekó, Judit & Prinz, Dániel & Weber, Andrea, 2024. "Take-up and labor supply responses to disability insurance earnings limits," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    3. Koning, Pierre & van Lent, Max, 2022. "Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 15164, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Alpino, Matteo & Hauge, Karen Evelyn & Kotsadam, Andreas & Markussen, Simen, 2022. "Effects of dialogue meetings on sickness absence—Evidence from a large field experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Cockx, Bart & Desiere, Sam, 2024. "Labour costs and the decision to hire the first employee," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    6. Ahammer, Alexander & Packham, Analisa, 2025. "Disability insurance screening and worker health," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    7. Grace Armijos Bravo & Judit Vall Castelló, 2025. "Job competition in civil service public exams and sick leave behaviour," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(1), pages 91-123, March.
    8. De Brouwer, Octave & Tojerow, Ilan, 2023. "The Growth of Disability Insurance in Belgium: Determinants and Policy Implications," IZA Discussion Papers 16376, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Pilar Garcia‐Gomez & Pierre Koning & Owen O'Donnell & Carlos Riumalló‐Herl, 2025. "Selective exercise of discretion in disability insurance awards," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 816-835, June.
    10. Koning, Pierre & Prudon, Roger, 2025. "Sick or Unemployed? Examining Transitions into Sickness Insurance at Unemployment Benefit Exhaustion," IZA Discussion Papers 18264, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty

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