Optimally Differentiated Carbon Prices for Unilateral Climate Policy
Economic thought on climate policy as an instance of environmental regulation is strongly influenced by the principle of a uniform carbon price. Economists acknowledge that this principle breaks down in a second-best world with other distortions, such as taxes and market power in domestic and international markets. However, systematic analysis of this point in the economic climate policy literature is scarce. In the present paper, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) set-up is chosen in order to examine what pattern of differentiated carbon prices emerges as optimal in a second-best world. The CGE model WorldScan, which is considered to be representative of the class of models routinely used for numerical climate policy analysis, produces three main results: First, the optimal pattern of carbon prices is highly differentiated, ranging from almost prohibitive taxes to high subsidies (with a range of more than 1700 euros per ton of CO2). Second, the welfare gain from switching from a uniform price to optimally differentiated prices is enormous, equivalent to a 27% emission reduction for free. Third, the most important drivers of carbon price differentiation are market power in export markets as well as taxes on consumption, intermediate inputs and domestic output. This shows that carbon price differentiation cannot be dismissed as a policy option lightly. However, before translating these findings into concrete policy advice, the relevant features of modelling pre-existing distortions in CGE models need close revision.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.socialpolitik.org/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ian W. H. Parry & Kenneth A. Small, 2005.
"Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1276-1289, September.
- Parry, Ian & Small, Kenneth, 2002. "Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax?," Discussion Papers dp-02-12-, Resources For the Future.
- Christoph Böhringer & Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi, 2013. "Unilateral Climate Policy and Competitiveness: Economic Implications of Differential Emission Pricing," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 121-154, 02.
- Rutherford, Thomas F., 1995. "Extension of GAMS for complementarity problems arising in applied economic analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1299-1324, November.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tol, Richard S. J., 2009. "The EU 20/20/2020 Targets: An Overview of the EMF22 Assessment," Papers WP325, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
- Arjan Lejour & Paul Veenendaal & Gerard Verweij & Nico van Leeuwen, 2006. "Worldscan; a model for international economic policy analysis," CPB Document 111, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Hoel, Michael, 1996. "Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, January.
- Hoel, M., 1993. "Should a Carbon Tax Be Differentiated Across Sectors?," Memorandum 09/1993, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Hoel, Michael, 1994. "Should a Carbon Tax be Differentiated Across Sectors?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- A. Bovenberg, 1999. "Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: an Updated Reader's Guide," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(3), pages 421-443, August.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Balistreri, Edward J. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2012. "The role of border carbon adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(S2), pages 97-110.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2014. "Optimal emission pricing in the presence of international spillovers: Decomposing leakage and terms-of-trade motives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 101-111.
- Christoph Böhringer & Andreas Lange & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2010. "Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives," NBER Working Papers 15899, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Christoph Böhringer & Andreas Lange & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2012. "Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives," Working Papers V-347-12, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2012.
- Boeters, Stefan & Koornneef, Joris, 2011. "Supply of renewable energy sources and the cost of EU climate policy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1024-1034, September.
- Stefan Boeters & J. Koornneef, 2010. "Supply of renewable energy sources and the cost of EU climate policy," CPB Discussion Paper 142, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
- Baumol, William J & Bradford, David F, 1970. "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 265-283, June.
- Markusen, James R., 1975. "International externalities and optimal tax structures," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79738. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.