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How mergers affect innovation: Theory and evidence from the pharmaceutical industry

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  • Haucap, Justus
  • Stiebale, Joel

Abstract

This papers analyses how horizontal mergers affect innovation activities of the merged entity and its non-merging competitors. We develop an oligopoly model with heterogeneous firms to derive empirically testable implications. Our model predicts that a merger is more likely to be profitable in an innovation intensive industry. For a high degree of firm heterogeneity, a merger reduces innovation of both the merged entity and non-merging competitors in an industry with high R&D intensity. Using data on horizontal mergers among pharmaceutical firms in Europe, we find that our empirical results are consistent with many predictions of the theoretical model. Our main result is that after a merger, patenting and R&D of the merged entity and its non-merging rivals declines substantially. The effects are concentrated in markets with high innovation intensity and a high degree of firm heterogeneity. The results are robust towards alternative specifications, using an instrumental variable strategy, and applying a propensity score matching estimator.

Suggested Citation

  • Haucap, Justus & Stiebale, Joel, 2016. "How mergers affect innovation: Theory and evidence from the pharmaceutical industry," DICE Discussion Papers 218, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:218
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph A. Clougherty & Tomaso Duso, 2009. "The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(8), pages 1365-1395, December.
    2. Ornaghi, Carmine, 2009. "Mergers and innovation in big pharma," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 70-79, January.
    3. Hall, Bronwyn H & Ziedonis, Rosemarie Ham, 2001. "The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 101-128, Spring.
    4. Blind, Knut & Cremers, Katrin & Mueller, Elisabeth, 2009. "The influence of strategic patenting on companies' patent portfolios," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 428-436, March.
    5. Junichiro Ishida & Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "Market Competition, R&D And Firm Profits In Asymmetric Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 484-505, September.
    6. Crepon, Bruno & Duguet, Emmanuel, 1997. "Estimating the Innovation Function from Patent Numbers: GMM on Count Panel Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 243-263, May-June.
    7. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, September.
    8. Werden, Gregory J., 1988. "The divergence of SIC industries from antitrust markets : Some evidence from price fixing cases," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 193-197.
    9. Robin Kleer, 2012. "The effect of mergers on the incentive to invest in cost-reducing innovations," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 287-322, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug Companies Merge
      by Justus Haucap in HBR Blog Network on 2016-08-03 17:05:51

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Fidanza, 2017. "Quali driver nella selezione delle target in operazioni di M&A? Una verifica empirica nel mercato italiano," Working Papers 52-2017, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Jan 2018.
    2. Céline Bonnet & Jan Philip Schain, 2020. "An Empirical Analysis of Mergers: Efficiency Gains and Impact on Consumer Prices," Post-Print hal-02952921, HAL.
    3. Bonnet, Céline & Schain, Jan Philip, 2017. "An empirical analysis of mergers: Efficiency gains and impact on consumer prices," DICE Discussion Papers 244, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Margaret K. Kyle, 2019. "The Alignment of Innovation Policy and Social Welfare: Evidence from Pharmaceuticals," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 20, pages 95-123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Anna Rita Bennato & Stephen Davies & Franco Mariuzzo & Peter Ormosi, 2019. "Mergers and Innovation: Evidence from the Hard Disk Drive Market," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2018-04v3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    6. Unsal, Omer & Rayfield, Blake, 2019. "Institutional investors and medical innovation," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 190-205.
    7. Unsal, Omer, 2020. "Two faces of corporate lobbying: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    8. Wolfgang Kerber, 2017. "Rights on Data: Competition, Innovation, and Competition Law: Dissecting the Interplay," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201742, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    9. Ralph Siebert & Zhili Tian, 2020. "Dynamic Mergers Effects on R&D Investments and Drug Development across Research Phases in the Pharmaceutical Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 8303, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mergers & acquisitions; innovation; R&D incentives; merger policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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