Non-benevolent central banks
Corruption at central banks induces distorted policies by generating a tendency to increase inflation. An inflation bias arises because the public distrusts central bank's benevolence, not only its commitments. We show that distrust among the public, measured by a high level of expected inflation, can have positive effects because it may sanction a conservative central banker, forcing him to lower realized inflation levels. Giving central banks a high level of independence will fail if this not only insulates central bankers from troublesome political interference but also provides them with the leeway necessary to carry out corrupt transactions.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen|
Web page: http://www.cege.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
- Wintrobe, Ronald & Breton, Albert, 1986. "Organizational Structure and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 530-38, June.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Mulligan, Casey B & Sala-I-Martin, Xavier X, 1997.
"The Optimum Quantity of Money: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 687-715, November.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin & Frederic S. Mishkin & Jonas D. M. Fisher, 1997. "The optimum quantity of money: theory and evidence," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 687-724.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1997. "The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence," Economics Working Papers 229, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, 1997. "The Optimum Quantity of Money: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.