IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpmi/0004007.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Learning in Economics: Where Do We Stand?

Author

Listed:
  • Tilman Slembeck

    (University of St.Gallen)

Abstract

This paper briefly reviews the current literature on learning in economics from a behavioral point of view. It critically compares theory with aspects of learning in real-life and with evidence from laboratory experiments, and argues that most customary approaches lack criteria for their applicability. Hence, there is a need for a theory that includes criteria when to employ which theory or which element(s) of existing theories contingent on the situation or environment in question. A discussion of several unsolved issues in economic learning stresses the fundamental role of learning conditions that have be neglected in the literature, but are accounted for in behavioral approaches such as "contingent learning".

Suggested Citation

  • Tilman Slembeck, 2000. "Learning in Economics: Where Do We Stand?," Microeconomics 0004007, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004007 Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP/PostScript/; pages: 22 ; figures: included. Discussion Paper No. 9907, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, August 1999, downloads at http://www.fgn.unisg.ch/public/public.htm
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mic/papers/0004/0004007.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 631-639.
    3. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 848-881.
    4. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining," Experimental 9905001, EconWPA.
    5. Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam, 1994. "Experimental Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521456821, December.
    6. Avery, Christopher & Zemsky, Peter, 1998. "Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 724-748.
    7. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
    8. repec:mes:challe:v:30:y:1987:i:1:p:57-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Duffy, John & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1997. "On the Robustness of Behaviour in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1684-1700, November.
    10. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 80-95, March.
    11. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
    12. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    13. Friedman, Daniel, 1998. "Monty Hall's Three Doors: Construction and Deconstruction of a Choice Anomaly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 933-946.
    14. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    15. Loomes, Graham, 1999. "Some Lessons from Past Experiments and Some Challenges for the Future," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 35-45, February.
    16. Starmer, Chris, 1999. "Experimental Economics: Hard Science or Wasteful Tinkering?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 5-15, February.
    17. Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
    18. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1402-1422.
    19. J. Van Huyck & R. Battalio & F. Rankin, 1996. "On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 548, David K. Levine.
    20. Sunder, S., 1992. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey," GSIA Working Papers 1992-19, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    21. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1347-1374.
    22. Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory," Virginia Economics Online Papers 306, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
    23. Loewenstein, George, 1999. "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 23-34, February.
    24. Antoni Bosch-DomËnech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2003. "Imitation of successful behaviour in cournot markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 495-524, April.
    25. Page, Scott E., 1998. "Let's make a deal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 175-180, November.
    26. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents," Experimental 9905002, EconWPA.
    27. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    28. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 251-278, October.
    29. Binmore, Ken, 1999. "Why Experiment in Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 16-24, February.
    30. Coles, Melvyn G. & Wright, Randall, 1998. "A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 32-54.
    31. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Gale, J., 1993. "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Working papers 9325, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Acevedo Rueda, Rafael Alexis, 2013. "El proceso de toma de decisiones: un modelo de economía conductual
      [The Decision Making Process: A Behavioral Economics Model]
      ," MPRA Paper 50890, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2013.
    2. Bornhorst, Fabian & Ichino, Andrea & Kirchkamp, Oliver & Schlag, Karl H. & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "How do people play a repeated trust game? : Experimental evidence," Papers 04-43, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    3. Siebenhuner, Bernd & Suplie, Jessica, 2005. "Implementing the access and benefit-sharing provisions of the CBD: A case for institutional learning," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 507-522, June.
    4. Novarese, Marco, 2007. "Individual learning in different social contexts," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 15-35, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic learning; behavioral economics; experiments; game theory; information feedback; contingent learning;

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.