IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Developing countries and enforcement of trade agreements : why dispute settlement is not enough

  • Bown, Chad P.
  • Bernard M., Hoekman

Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/12/18/000158349_20071218085351/Rendered/PDF/wps4450.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4450.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4450
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Wei, Shang-Jin & Zhang, Zhiwei, 2010. "Do external interventions work? The case of trade reform conditions in IMF supported programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 71-81, May.
  2. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2005. "A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5321, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. James P. Durling, 2003. "Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 125-153, March.
  4. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank.
  5. Shang-Jin Wei & Arvind Subramanian, 2003. "The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly," IMF Working Papers 03/185, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The Economics of the World Trading System," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524341, June.
  7. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(3), pages 811-823, August.
  8. Shaffer, Gregory, 2006. "The challenges of WTO law: strategies for developing country adaptation," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(02), pages 177-198, July.
  9. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
  10. Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, 2005. "WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 861-890, December.
  11. Eschenbach, Felix & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Services policies in transition economies: on the EU and WTO as commitment mechanisms," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(03), pages 415-443, November.
  12. Joseph Francois & Will Martin, 2002. "Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access," International Trade 0210002, EconWPA.
  13. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2000. "WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(04), pages 527-542, 04.
  14. Petros C. Mavroidis & Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The case for tradable remedies in WTO dispute settlement," Discussion Papers 0405-05, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  15. Horn, Henrik & Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert, 2007. "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 6037, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Bernard Hoekman & Aaditya Mattoo, 2007. "Regulatory Cooperation, Aid For Trade And The Gats," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 399-418, October.
  17. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March.
  18. Levy, Philip I & Srinivasan, T N, 1996. "Regionalism and the (Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Access," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 93-98, May.
  19. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C & Nordström, Håkan, 1999. "Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Participation in," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 287-310.
  21. Simeon Djankov & Bernard Hoekman, 1998. "Conditions of Competition and Multilateral Surveillance," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(8), pages 1109-1128, November.
  22. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 59-80, 01.
  23. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December.
  24. Sykes, Alan O., 2003. "The safeguards mess: a critique of WTO jurisprudence," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 261-295, November.
  25. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Global antidumping database version 1.0," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3737, The World Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4450. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.