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Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Francois

    (Tinbergen Institute)

  • Will Martin

    (World Bank)

Abstract

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of “market access,” emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Francois & Will Martin, 2002. "Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access," International Trade 0210002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0210002
    Note: Type of Document - Adobe pdf file; prepared on WindowsXP; figures: 2. Also a recent CEPR discussion paper, forthcoming EER in 2002/2003.
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barari, Mahua & Lapan, Harvey E., 1993. "Stochastic trade policy with asset markets : The role of tariff structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3-4), pages 317-333, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    expected costs of protection; commercial policy uncertainty; market access WTO; tariff bindings.;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F17 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General

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