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Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough

  • Bown, Chad P.
  • Hoekman, Bernard

Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal WTO trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce WTO rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the WTO is important to make trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. While our focus is on the WTO system, our arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6459.

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Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6459
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  12. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Participation in," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 287-310.
  13. Wei, Shang-Jin & Zhang, Zhiwei, 2010. "Do external interventions work? The case of trade reform conditions in IMF supported programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 71-81, May.
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