The political economy of targeted safety nets
This paper is the written version of a lecture that draws principally on research on safety nets and operational experience with the implementation of safety nets, drawing heavily on the crisis of safety net programs in Indonesia from 1998 to 2000. As such it provides more views than reviews of the literature on the principal issues in the political economy of targeted safety net programs. The text is followed by a Q&A that clarifies views put perhaps too starkly in the text. Five major issues are reviewed. First, the implications of some simple models of electoral politics which make the budget allocated to programs endogenous to their targeting design highlight the dangers in ignoring political economy. Second, the political economy of safety net versus safety rope programs is reviewed. Third, some of the literature on the perception of fairness of the targeting criteria is reviewed. Fourth, the issue of local versus central targeting of programs is discussed. Fifth, the political economy of program implementation that considers the fit between program targeting and the organizational culture of the implementing organization is considered.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/spl
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-46, June.
- Cox, Donald C & Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1992. "Social Security and Private Transfers in Developing Countries: The Case of Peru," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(1), pages 155-69, January.
- Chris Manning, 2000. "Labour Market Adjustment to Indonesia's Economic Crisis: Context, Trends and Implications," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(1), pages 105-136.
- Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995.
"Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May.
- Cameron, Lisa A., 2002. "Did social safety net scholarships reduce drop-out rates during the Indonesian economic crisis?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2800, The World Bank.
- Jyotsna Jalan & Martin Ravallion, 2000.
"Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity Score Matching,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0873, Econometric Society.
- Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 2003. "Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 21(1), pages 19-30, January.
- Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2000. "Distributional outcomes of a decentralized welfare program," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2316, The World Bank.
- Frankenberg, E. & Thomas, D. & Beegle, K., 1999.
"The Real Costs of Indonesia's Economic Crisis: Preliminary Findings from the Indonesia Family Life Surveys,"
99-04, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
- Elizabeth Frankenberg & Duncan Thomas & Kathleen Beegle, 1999. "The Real Costs of Indonesian Economic Crisis: Preliminary Findings from the Indonesia Family Life Surveys," Working Papers 99-04, RAND Corporation.
- Milanovic Branko, 1994.
"Cash Social Transfers, Direct Taxes, and Income Distribution in Late Socialism,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 175-197, April.
- Milanovic, Branko, 1993. "Cash social transfers, direct taxes, and income distribution in late socialism," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1176, The World Bank.
- Ferreira, Francisco & Prennushi, Giovanna & Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Protecting the poor from macroeconomic shocks," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2160, The World Bank.
- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998.
"Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government,"
NBER Working Papers
6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 144, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- David Coady & Margaret Grosh & John Hoddinott, 2004. "Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries : Review of Lessons and Experience," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 14902.
- Pritchett, Lant & Suryahadi, Asep & Sumarto, Sudarno & Suharso, Yusuf, 2000. "The evolution of poverty during the crisis in Indonesia, 1996-99," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2435, The World Bank.
- Sumarto, Sudarno & Suryahadi, Asep & Pritchett, Lant, 2000. "Safety nets and safety ropes - who benefited from two Indonesian crisis programs - the"poor"or the"shocked"?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2436, The World Bank.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 1998.
"The Political Economy of Targeting,"
Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 177-200, April.
- van de Walle, Dominique, 1994. "The Distribution of Subsidies through Public Health Services in Indonesia, 1978-87," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 8(2), pages 279-309, May.
- Bob Baulch & John Hoddinott, 2000. "Economic mobility and poverty dynamics in developing countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(6), pages 1-24.
- Alderman, Harold & von Braun, Joachim, 1984. "The effects of the Egyptian food ration and subsidy system on income distribution and consumption:," Research reports 45, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:hdnspu:31498. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Raiden C. Dillard)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.