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Grads on the Go: The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions On Worker Earnings

Author

Listed:
  • Brian Callaci

    (Open Markets Institute)

  • Matthew Gibson

    (Williams College and IZA)

  • Sérgio Pinto

    (University of Maryland at College Park and Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), DINAMIA’CET)

  • Marshall Steinbaum

    (University of Utah)

  • Matt Walsh

    (Lightcast)

Abstract

We evaluate the nationwide impact of the Washington State attorney general’s 2018-2020 enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts, which prohibited worker movement across locations within a chain. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports from numerous industries, we estimate a 6 percent increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and a 4 percent increase in worker-reported earnings.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Callaci & Matthew Gibson & Sérgio Pinto & Marshall Steinbaum & Matt Walsh, 2024. "Grads on the Go: The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions On Worker Earnings," Upjohn Working Papers 24-405, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:24-405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employer market power; oligopsony; monopsony; franchising chains; antitrust; wages; salaries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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