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Evidence on the Incidence of Wage Posting, Wage Bargaining, and On-the-Job Search

Author

Listed:
  • Robert E. Hall
  • Alan B. Krueger

Abstract

Some workers bargain with prospective employers before accepting a job. Others face a posted wage as a take-it-or-leave-it opportunity. Both modes of wage determination have generated large bodies of research. We surveyed a representative sample of US workers to inquire about the wage determination process at the time they were hired into their current or most recent jobs. A third of the respondents reported bargaining over pay before accepting their current jobs. Almost a third of workers had precise information about pay when they first met with their employers, a sign of wage posting. About 40 percent of workers were on-the-job searchers-they could have remained at their earlier jobs at the time they accepted their current jobs, indicating a more favorable bargaining position than is held by unemployed job-seekers. About half of all workers reported that their employers had learned their pay in their earlier jobs before making the offer that led to the current job. (JEL C83, J31, J52, J64)

Suggested Citation

  • Robert E. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, 2012. "Evidence on the Incidence of Wage Posting, Wage Bargaining, and On-the-Job Search," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 56-67, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:4:y:2012:i:4:p:56-67
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.4.56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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