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Teacher Value-Added and Economic Agency

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  • Hugh Macartney
  • Robert McMillan
  • Uros Petronijevic

Abstract

We present an estimable framework expressing teacher value-added in terms of teacher ability and effort, along with a strategy to identify these two unobserved inputs and their distinct test score effects for the first time. This uses exogenous incentive policy variation and rich longitudinal data from North Carolina. We find both inputs raise current and future scores, and effort responds systematically to incentives, underlining the agency of the teaching force. To explore the policy implications of this agency, we use our estimates to compare the cost effectiveness of incentive and ability-based education reforms, finding incentive reforms often come out ahead.

Suggested Citation

  • Hugh Macartney & Robert McMillan & Uros Petronijevic, 2019. "Teacher Value-Added and Economic Agency," Working Papers tecipa-650, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-650
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    Cited by:

    1. Yeşilırmak, Muharrem, 2021. "A theoretical general equilibrium analysis of local teacher labor markets under different compensation regimes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 25-38.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives; Education Production; Effort; Ability; Teacher Value- Added; Accountability; Education Policy; Cost-Effectiveness; Persistence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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