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Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics (revision of 2017-021) : Empirics

Author

Listed:
  • Abbring, Jaap

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Campbell, J.R.
  • Tilly, J.
  • Yang, N.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper develops an econometric model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. The model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, which can be computed very quickly. We show that its primitives are identified from market-level data on the number of active firms and demand shifters, and we implement a nested fixed point procedure for its estimation. Estimates from County Business Patterns data on U.S. local cinema markets point to tough local competition. Sunk costs make the industry's transition following a permanent demand shock last 10 to 15 years.

Suggested Citation

  • Abbring, Jaap & Campbell, J.R. & Tilly, J. & Yang, N., 2018. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics (revision of 2017-021) : Empirics," Discussion Paper 2018-040, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3a12f099-900b-44ac-b692-a14d7788dd0e
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/27877967/2018_040.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Haltiwanger & Ron Jarmin & C. J. Krizan, 2010. "Mom-and-Pop Meet Big Box: Complements or Substitutes?," NBER Chapters,in: Cities and Entrepreneurship National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ricard Gil & Francine Lafontaine, 2012. "Using Revenue Sharing to Implement Flexible Prices: Evidence from Movie Exhibition Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 187-219, June.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-569, May.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    5. Preston R. Fee & Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, 2004. "What Is a Barrier to Entry?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 461-465, May.
    6. Davis, Peter, 2002. "Estimating multi-way error components models with unbalanced data structures," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 67-95, January.
    7. Fedor Iskhakov & Jinhyuk Lee & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning & Kyoungwon Seo, 2016. "Comment on “Constrained Optimization Approaches to Estimation of Structural Models”," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 365-370, January.
    8. Alon Eizenberg, 2014. "Upstream Innovation and Product Variety in the U.S. Home PC Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 1003-1045.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abbring, Jaap & Campbell, J.R. & Tilly, J. & Yang, N., 2017. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics : Theory," Discussion Paper 2017-020, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    demand uncertainty; dynamic oligopoly; firm entry and exit; nested fixed point estimator; sunk costs; toughness of competition; cunterfactual plicy analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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