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Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Jaap H. Abbring

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Jeffrey R. Campbell

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and NBER)

Abstract

This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, a sequence of thresholds describes firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for that structure. See also the article in Econometrica (2010)78, 1491–1527.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell, 2006. "Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-110/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 22 Jan 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060110
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    Cited by:

    1. Abito, Jose Miguel & Knittel, Christopher R. & Metaxoglou, Konstantinos & Trindade, André, 2022. "The role of output reallocation and investment in coordinating environmental markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Suguru Otani, 2024. "Industry Dynamics with Cartels: The Case of the Container Shipping Industry," Discussion Paper Series DP2024-28, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    3. Hanazono, Makoto & Yang, Huanxing, 2009. "Dynamic entry and exit with uncertain cost positions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 474-487, May.
    4. Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell & Jan Tilly & Nan Yang, 2018. "Very Simple Markov‐Perfect Industry Dynamics: Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 721-735, March.
    5. Martin Lábaj & Alzbeta Siskovicova & Barbora Skalicanova & Peter Silanic & Christoph Weiss & Biliana Yontcheva, 2015. "Market Structure and Competition in the Health-care Industry: Results from a Transition Economy," Department of Economic Policy Working Paper Series 010, Department of Economic Policy, Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava.
    6. Armand, Alex & Mendi, Pedro, 2018. "Demand drops and innovation investments: Evidence from the Great Recession in Spain," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(7), pages 1321-1333.
    7. Joao Macieira, 2010. "Oblivious Equilibrium in Dynamic Discrete Games," 2010 Meeting Papers 680, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Wilson, Nathan E., 2012. "Uncertain regulatory timing and market dynamics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 102-115.
    9. Victor Aguirregabiria & Allan Collard-Wexler & Stephen P. Ryan, 2021. "Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization," NBER Working Papers 29291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Martin Lábaj & Karol Morvay & Peter Silanič & Christoph Weiss & Biliana Yontcheva, 2018. "Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(15), pages 1694-1715, March.
    11. Jose-Miguel Abito & Christopher R. Knittel & Konstantinos Metaxoglou & André Trindade, 2018. "Coordinating Separate Markets for Externalities," NBER Working Papers 24481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Steven T Berry & Giovanni Compiani, 2023. "An Instrumental Variable Approach to Dynamic Models," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1724-1758.
    13. Taisuke Otsu & Martin Pesendorfer, 2021. "Equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic games: testing and estimation," STICERD - Econometrics Paper Series 618, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    14. Taisuke Otsu & Martin Pesendorfer, 2023. "Equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic games: Testing and estimation," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 26(1), pages 26-42.
    15. Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell & Jan Tilly & Nan Yang, 2018. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Empirics," Working Paper Series WP-2018-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    16. Allan Collard-Wexler, 2010. "Productivity Dispersion and Plant Selection in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry," 2010 Meeting Papers 105, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Suguru Otani, 2024. "Industry Dynamics with Cartels: The Case of the Container Shipping Industry," Papers 2407.15147, arXiv.org.
    18. Abbring, Jaap & Campbell, J.R. & Tilly, J. & Yang, N., 2018. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics (revision of 2017-021) : Empirics," Discussion Paper 2018-040, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    19. Martin Lábaj & Karol Morvay & Peter Silaniè & Christoph Weiss, 2014. "Market Structure in Transition: Entry and Competition in Slovakia," Department of Economic Policy Working Paper Series 005, Department of Economic Policy, Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava.
    20. Armand, Alex & Mendi, Pedro, 2017. "Demand Fluctuations and Innovation Investments: Evidence from the Great Recession in Spain," MPRA Paper 76884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell, 2006. "Oligopoly dynamics with barriers to entry," Working Paper Series WP-06-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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