On the Importance of Baseline Setting in Carbon Offsets Markets
Incorporating carbon offsets in the design of cap-and-trade programs remains a controversial issue because of its potential unintended impacts on emissions. At the heart of this discussion is the issue of crediting of emissions reductions. Projects can be correctly, over- or under-credited for their actual emissions reductions. We develop a unified framework that considers the supply of offsets within a cap-and-trade program that allows us to compare the relative impact of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions on overall emissions under different levels of baseline stringency and carbon prices. In the context of a national carbon pricing scheme that includes offsets, we find that the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets can be fully balanced out by under-credited emissions reductions without sacrificing a significant portion of the overall supply of offsets, provided emissions baselines are stringent enough. In the presence of high predicted business-as-usual (BAU) emissions uncertainty or low carbon prices, to maintain the environmental integrity of the program, baselines need to be set at stringent levels, in some cases below 50 percent of predicted BAU emissions. As predicted BAU emissions uncertainty declines or as the carbon market achieves higher equilibrium prices, however, less stringent baselines can balance out the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions. These results imply that to maintain environmental integrity of offsets programs, baseline stringency should be tailored to project characteristics and market conditions that influence the proportion of over-credited offsets to under-credited emissions reductions.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mansanet-Bataller, Maria & Chevallier, Julien & Hervé-Mignucci, Morgan & Alberola, Emilie, 2011.
"EUA and sCER phase II price drivers: Unveiling the reasons for the existence of the EUA-sCER spread,"
Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1056-1069, March.
- Emilie Alberola & Maria Mansanet-Bataller & Julien Chevallier & Morgan Hervé-Mignucci, 2011. "EUA and sCER phase II price drivers: Unveiling the reasons for the existence of the EUA-sCER spread," Post-Print hal-00575614, HAL.
- van Benthem, Arthur & Kerr, Suzi, 2013. "Scale and transfers in international emissions offset programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 31-46.
- Goulder, Lawrence H. & Hafstead, Marc A.C. & Dworsky, Michael, 2010. "Impacts of alternative emissions allowance allocation methods under a federal cap-and-trade program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 161-181, November.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2000. "Optimal design of a phase-in emissions trading program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 273-291, February.
- Zhang, Junjie & Wang, Can, 2011. "Co-benefits and additionality of the clean development mechanism: An empirical analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 140-154, September.
- Menges, Roland, 2003. "Supporting renewable energy on liberalised markets: green electricity between additionality and consumer sovereignty," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 583-596, June.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 2005. "Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions: balancing trade-offs with baselines," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(14), pages 1807-1823, September.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 2004. "Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-offs with Baselines," Discussion Papers dp-04-32, Resources For the Future.
- Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
- Harrison Fell & Richard Morgenstern, 2010. "Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 275-297, October.
- Fell, Harrison & Morgenstern, Richard, 2009. "Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System," Discussion Papers dp-09-14, Resources For the Future.
- Erickson, Peter & Lazarus, Michael & Spalding-Fecher, Randall, 2014. "Net climate change mitigation of the Clean Development Mechanism," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 146-154.
- Fell, Harrison & Burtraw, Dallas & Morgenstern, Richard D. & Palmer, Karen L., 2012. "Soft and hard price collars in a cap-and-trade system: A comparative analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 183-198.
- Horowitz, John K. & Just, Richard E., 2013. "Economics of additionality for environmental services from agriculture," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 105-122.
- Katherine Calvin & Steven Rose & Marshall Wise & Haewon McJeon & Leon Clarke & Jae Edmonds, 2015. "Global climate, energy, and economic implications of international energy offsets programs," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 133(4), pages 583-596, December.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/5109 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bento, Antonio M. & Kanbur, Ravi & Leard, Benjamin, 2015. "Designing efficient markets for carbon offsets with distributional constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 51-71.
- Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November.
- Warnecke, Carsten & Wartmann, Sina & Höhne, Niklas & Blok, Kornelis, 2014. "Beyond pure offsetting: Assessing options to generate Net-Mitigation-Effects in carbon market mechanisms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 413-422. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-16-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.