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Cap-and-Trade Programs under Delayed Compliance

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  • Hasegawa, Makoto
  • Salant, Stephen

    () (Resources for the Future)

Abstract

Previous analyses of cap-and-trade programs regulating carbon emissions assumed that firms must surrender permits as they pollute. If so, then the price of permits may remain constant over measurable intervals if the government injects additional permits at a ceiling price or may even collapse if more permits are injected through an auction. However, no cap-and-trade program actually requires continual compliance. The three federal bills and California's AB-32, for example, instead require that firms surrender permits only periodically to cover their cumulative emissions since the last compliance period. Anticipated injections of additional permits during the compliance period should have different effects than under continual compliance. We develop a methodology for analyzing the effects of such permit injections. Using it, we explain why sales provisions of one federal bill might generate a speculative attack in the permit market and why provisions of AB-32 may undermine the very existence of an equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen, 2012. "Cap-and-Trade Programs under Delayed Compliance," Discussion Papers dp-12-32, Resources For the Future.
  • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-12-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holland, Stephen P. & Moore, Michael R., 2013. "Market design in cap and trade programs: Permit validity and compliance timing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 671-687.
    2. Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 101-115.
    3. Salant, Stephen W, 1983. "The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(1), pages 1-38, February.
    4. Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W, 1978. "Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 627-648, August.
    5. Harrison Fell & Richard Morgenstern, 2010. "Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 275-297, October.
    6. Jacoby, Henry D. & Ellerman, A. Denny, 2004. "The safety valve and climate policy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 481-491, March.
    7. Fell, Harrison & Burtraw, Dallas & Morgenstern, Richard D. & Palmer, Karen L., 2012. "Soft and hard price collars in a cap-and-trade system: A comparative analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 183-198.
    8. Paul Leiby & Jonathan Rubin, 2001. "Intertemporal Permit Trading for the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(3), pages 229-256, July.
    9. Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen, 2012. "Cap-and-Trade Programs under Continual Compliance," Discussion Papers dp-12-33, Resources For the Future.
    10. Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen, 2012. "Cap-and-Trade Programs under Continual Compliance," Discussion Papers dp-12-33, Resources For the Future.
    2. Shobe, William & Holt, Charles & Huetteman, Thaddeus, 2014. "Elements of emission market design: An experimental analysis of California's market for greenhouse gas allowances," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 402-420.
    3. Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2015. "Harvest efficiency and fishery discards under harvest uncertainty and trading restrictions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 72-91.
    4. Holland, Stephen P. & Yates, Andrew J., 2015. "Optimal trading ratios for pollution permit markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 16-27.
    5. Makoto Hasegawa & Stephen Salant, 2015. "The Dynamics of Pollution Permits," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 61-79, October.
    6. Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2016. "Permit Market Auctions with Allowance Reserves," Discussion Papers Series 553, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    emissions trading; marketable permits; price collar; safety valve; price ceiling; price floor;

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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