Probabilistic Sophistication and Reverse Bayesianism
This paper extends our earlier work on reverse Bayesianism by relaxing the assumption that decision makers abide by expected utility theory, assuming instead weaker axioms that merely imply that they are probabilistically sophisticated. We show that our main results, namely, (modified) representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that constitute "reverse Bayesianism," remain valid.
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- Mark J. Machina & David Schmeidler, 1994.
"Bayes Without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice,"
1088, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Machina Mark J. & Schmeidler David, 1995. "Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 106-128, October.
- Grant, Simon & Polak, Ben, 2006. "Bayesian beliefs with stochastic monotonicity: An extension of Machina and Schmeidler," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 264-282, September.
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