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Probabilistic Sophistication and Stochastic Monotonicity in the Savage Framework

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Machina & Schmeidler (1992) show that probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in a Savage setting without imposing expected utility by dropping Savage's axiom P2 (sure-thing principle) and strengthening his axiom P4 (weak comparative probability). Their stronger axiom, however, embodies a degree of separability analogous to P2. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using Savage's original axiom P4 and a weaker analog of Savage's P2.

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  • Simon Grant & Hatice Ozsoy & Ben Polak, 2007. "Probabilistic Sophistication and Stochastic Monotonicity in the Savage Framework," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1621, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1621
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Machina Mark J. & Schmeidler David, 1995. "Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 106-128, October.
    2. Sarin, Rakesh & Wakker, Peter P., 2000. "Cumulative dominance and probabilistic sophistication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 191-196, September.
    3. Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-780, July.
    4. Grant, Simon & Polak, Ben, 2006. "Bayesian beliefs with stochastic monotonicity: An extension of Machina and Schmeidler," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 264-282, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fleurbaey, Marc & Zuber, Stéphane, 2017. "Fair management of social risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 666-706.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subjective probability; Probabilistic sophistication; Stochastic monotonicity; Sure-thing principle; Cumulative dominance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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