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Strategic bidding, wind ownership and regulation in a decentralised electricity market

Author

Listed:
  • Walsh, Darragh
  • Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura
  • Di Cosmo, Valeria

Abstract

Market power often emerges in wholesale electricity markets. Regulators use several strategies to limit market power: adopting bidding rules, compulsory forward markets and enhancing demand response. We study the case of the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM), where the market will eliminate strict bidding rules to comply with the European Target Electricity Model. Using the PLEXOS unit-commitment model, we simulate the price that emerges in Cournot competition and find that it is more than 60% higher than in perfect competition. We then study how much the price varies with three measures that influence market power. Limiting thermal generators’ ownership of wind generation does not affect prices. Forcing the largest firm to sell some of its output forward decreases prices, but keeps them well above competitive levels. The most effective measure is an increase in price elasticity of demand, although existing evidence shows that it is hard to achieve. We conclude that regulatory oversight of bids will have to continue, although the Target Model will be associated with limited transparency, creating further challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Walsh, Darragh & Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura & Di Cosmo, Valeria, 2016. "Strategic bidding, wind ownership and regulation in a decentralised electricity market," MPRA Paper 71502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:71502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Valeria Di Cosmo & Sean Collins & Paul Deane, 2017. "The Effect of Increased Transmission and Storage in an Interconnected Europe: an Application to France and Ireland," Working Papers 2017.37, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Gaffney, F. & Deane, J.P. & Gallachóir, B.P.Ó, 2017. "A 100 year review of electricity policy in Ireland (1916–2015)," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 67-79.
    3. Di Cosmo, Valeria & Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura, 2018. "Wind, storage, interconnection and the cost of electricity generation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-18.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; oligopoly; wind generation; forward contracts; demand response;

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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