IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pcc/pccumd/09vpp.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Virtual Power Plant Auctions

Author

Abstract

Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2009. "Virtual Power Plant Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 09vpp, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09vpp
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/ausubel-cramton-virtual-power-plant-auctions.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christian Schultz, 2005. "Virtual Capacity and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1487, CESifo.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05.
    4. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chinmoy, Lakshmi & Iniyan, S. & Goic, Ranko, 2019. "Modeling wind power investments, policies and social benefits for deregulated electricity market – A review," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 242(C), pages 364-377.
    2. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas, 2021. "Sweden's Energy Investment Challenge," Working Paper Series 1383, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Peña, Juan Ignacio, 2011. "Las emisiones primarias de energía en el mercado español: valoración de opciones teórica y de mercado/Primary Energy Emissions in the Spanish Market: Theoretical and Market-Based Option Pricing," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 29, pages 617-626, Agosto.
    4. de Frutos, María-Ángeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2012. "How to allocate forward contracts: The case of electricity markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 451-469.
    5. Federico, Giulio & López, Ángel L., 2013. "Optimal asset divestments with homogeneous products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 12-25.
    6. Anna Creti & Jerome Pouyet & María-Eugenia Sanin, 2013. "The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 196-213, April.
    7. Marambio, Rodrigo & Rudnick, Hugh, 2017. "A novel inclusion of intermittent generation resources in long term energy auctions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 29-40.
    8. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2018. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-137, February.
    9. Ciarreta, Aitor & Nasirov, Shahriyar & Silva, Carlos, 2016. "The development of market power in the Spanish power generation sector: Perspectives after market liberalization," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 700-710.
    10. Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta, 2012. "Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(2), pages 309-322, June.
    11. Luiz T. A. Maurer & Luiz A. Barroso, 2011. "Electricity Auctions : An Overview of Efficient Practices," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2346, July.
    12. Biegel, Benjamin & Hansen, Lars Henrik & Stoustrup, Jakob & Andersen, Palle & Harbo, Silas, 2014. "Value of flexible consumption in the electricity markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 354-362.
    13. Stern, Jon, 2012. "Developing upstream competition in the England and Wales water supply industry: A new approach," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 1-16.
    14. Mariusz Swora & Jacek KamiÅ„ski, 2017. "Bringing in Liquidity and Transparency when the Power Sector is Consolidated: The Duty to Trade on the Power Exchange," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 8(1).
    15. Walsh, Darragh & Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura & Di Cosmo, Valeria, 2016. "Strategic bidding, wind ownership and regulation in a decentralised electricity market," MPRA Paper 71502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Fei Ye & Lixu Li & Zhiqiang Wang & Yina Li, 2018. "An Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Model for Carbon Emission Quota Allocation among Industries: Evidence from Guangdong Province, China," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(11), pages 1-18, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June.
    2. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June.
    3. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
    4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
    5. Dan Levin, 2005. "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 467-471, March.
    6. Pär Holmberg, 2017. "Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 372-395, October.
    7. Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    8. Liu, Jinzhao & Gao, Shenghao & Zhou, Jun, 2019. "Clustering and discounting in auction-style SEOs – Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    9. Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 95-113, August.
    10. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 2005. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 508-518, March.
    11. Cumpston, Anne & Khezr, Peyman, 2020. "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature," MPRA Paper 101336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Discussion Papers 03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    13. Schnitzlein, Charles R. & Shao, Minjie, 2013. "Capacity constraints and the winner's curse in multi-unit common value auctions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 188-201.
    14. Betz, Regina & Seifert, Stefan & Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2010. "Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(2), pages 1-20.
    15. Eva Benz & Andreas Löschel & Bodo Sturm, 2010. "Auctioning of CO 2 emission allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(6), pages 705-718, November.
    16. Rosen, Christiane & Madlener, Reinhard, 2012. "Auction Design for Local Reserve Energy Markets," FCN Working Papers 7/2012, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), revised Mar 2013.
    17. Peter Cramton, 2009. "Innovation and Market Design," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 113-137.
    18. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    19. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018. "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 1257, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 27 Mar 2019.
    20. Anabela Botelho & Lígia Costa Pinto & Eduarda Fernandes, 2013. "More on the dynamic Vickrey mechanism for multi-unit auctions: an experimental study on the emission permits initial auction," NIMA Working Papers 53, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; electricity auctions; market design; virtual power plant auctions; clock auction; combinatorial auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09vpp. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://www.cramton.umd.edu .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Cramton (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cramton.umd.edu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.