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The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river

  • Béal, Sylvain
  • Rémila, Eric
  • Solal, Philippe

We introduce the sequential equal surplus division for sharing the total welfare resulting form the cooperation of agents along a river with a delta. This allocation rule can be seen as a generalization of the contribution vectors introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007) in the context of TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sequential equal surplus division.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37346/1/MPRA_paper_37346.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37346.

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Date of creation: 14 Mar 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37346
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  1. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper 2004-50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Gabrielle Demange, 2004. "On Group Stability in Hierarchies and Networks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 754-778, August.
  3. Haller, Hans, 1994. "Collusion Properties of Values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 261-81.
  4. Herings, P. Jean Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf, 2008. "The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 77-92, January.
  5. Khmelnitskaya, A. & Talman, A.J.J., 2010. "Tree-Type Values for Cycle-Free Directed Graph Games," Discussion Paper 2010-113, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
  7. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2009. "Sequential Sharing Rules for River Sharing Problems," Working Papers 2009.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
  9. M. J. Albizuri, 2001. "An axiomatization of the modified Banzhaf Coleman index," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 167-176.
  10. M. Albizuri & Jesus Aurrekoetxea, 2006. "Coalition Configurations and the Banzhaf Index," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 571-596, June.
  11. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Valeri Vasil’ev, 2007. "Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 349-364, November.
  12. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
  13. Aadland, David & Kolpin, Van, 1998. "Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 203-218, March.
  14. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2010. "Rooted-tree solutions for tree games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 404-408, June.
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