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International R&D Rivalry with a Shipping Firm

  • Takauchi, Kazuhiro

To examine the role of shipping firms in the international research and development (R&D) rivalry, we build a two-country (exporting and importing), two-firm (exporting and local) duopoly model with a shipping firm. The exporting firm competes with the local firm in the duopoly market of the local country but must pay a shipping fee to the shipping firm in order to sell its product in the local market. Similar to market competition, exporting and local firms engage in R&D competition. We compare two timing structures of the game: in one, the R&D stage is first, and in the other, the shipping firm is the leader. We show that when the R&D stage is first, there are ranges of parameter values such that the investment level of the exporting firm decreases as R&D becomes more efficient. When the shipping firm is the leader, we show that there are ranges of parameter values such that the profit of the local firm decreases as R&D becomes more efficient. Further, it is shown that consumers in the local country prefer the regime in which the shipping firm is the leader, whereas the government of the local country prefers the other regime.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 36843.

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Date of creation: 20 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:36843
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