Foreign Technology, Spillovers and R&D Policy
We study the nature of appropriate domestic R\&D policy in an imperfectly competitive world, where both the R\&D rivalry among firms and the presence of technological spillovers from a superior foreign technology play a crucial role.There are two firms (a foreign and a domestic firm) that are located in the domestic country, produce a commodity that is sold overseas and compete both in an output and an R\&D stage. We use the basic Spencer and Brander (1983) model with three modifications. First, we introduce R\&D dynamics by considering both an initial R\&D investment and a subsequent improvement. Firms invest in R\&D in period one and can make further improvements in period two. Second, we introduce an asymmetry between the two firms: the foreign firm is more advanced -so it has to invest fewer resources to achieve a given technological level. Third, we consider technological spillovers between firms. We find that the appropriate R&D policy balances the strategic incentive to induce a reduction in foreign initial R&D with the spillover incentive to induce the foreign firm to invest more. If initial foreign R &D increases the present value of domestic profits (i.e., the spillover effect dominates), either a tax to first period domestic R&D or a subsidy to domestic imitation is appropriate. If instead improvements in first period foreign technology have a negative effect on the present value of domestic profits (i.e., the strategic effect dominates) a subsidy to first period domestic R\&D is appropriate.In this case, the nature of the optimal policy on imitation will depend on the relative importance of first and second period effects.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983.
"International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bhaskar Dutta & Kotaro Suzumura, 1993. "On the Sustainability of Collaborative R&D through Private Incentives," Discussion Paper Series a276, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:9411001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.