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Union Structure and Firms Incentives for Cooperative R&D Investments

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  • Constantine Manasakis
  • Emmanuel Petrakis

    () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

Abstract

We examine how different unionisation structures and the spillovers of R&D activities affect R&D investments and firms’ incentives to form a Research Joint Venture. We find that whenever firms invest non-cooperatively, an industry union increases R&D investments, if industry specific spillovers are low. In case of a Research Joint Venture, investments are always higher under firm-level unions. We also find that firms’ incentives to form a Research Joint Venture are stronger when they face an industry union, if spillovers are low. Rigidities in the labour market, such as high unemployment benefits or/and a central union, have negative effects on employment, output and profits and hinder the diffusion of the efficiency created by a RJV to consumers and employees. Integrated labour market and R&D policies are also discussed.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Constantine Manasakis & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Union Structure and Firms Incentives for Cooperative R&D Investments," Working Papers 0705, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0705
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Minas Vlassis & Maria Varvataki, 2014. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation: Do Unions Affect Quality? Dynamic Analysis," Working Papers 1410, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    2. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2014. "Capacity Choice and Welfare under Alternative Unionisation Structures," Working Paper series 12_14, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    3. Falvey, Rod & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Teerasuwannajak, Khemarat Talerngsri, 2013. "Coordination costs and research joint ventures," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 965-976.
    4. Takauchi, Kazuhiro, 2015. "Endogenous transport price and international R&D rivalry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 36-43.
    5. Minas Vlassis & Maria Varvataki, 2014. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation: Do Unions Affect Quality?," Working Papers 1409, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    6. Luis M. Granero, 2006. "Codetermination, R&D, and Employment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 309-328, June.
    7. Ben Ferrett & Vasileios Zikos, 2013. "Wage-Setting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Networks," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 61-78, June.
    8. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2013. "Endogenous domestic market structure and the effects of a trade cost reduction in a unionised industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 30-33.
    9. Asproudis, Elias, 2011. "Trade union structure with environmental concern and firms' technological choice," MPRA Paper 28767, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unions; Oligopoly; Cost-reducing Innovations; Research Joint Ventures; Spillovers;

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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