Trade union structure with environmental concern and firms' technological choice
I investigate the influence of the union structure on firms' environmental technological choice when the unions care for the environmental protection. Specifically, I compare the decentralised with the centralised structure under a Cournot duopoly. I show that the decentralised structure could always provide higher incentives to the firms for the adoption of a better (less polluting) technology. In addition, the firms prefer the decentralised unionisation than the centralised although the unions prefer the centralised structure. Furthermore, there is an inverse U-shape relation between the firm's emissions and the size of the market. Finally, the emissions could be less under the centralised case compared to the decentralised for relatively low market's size.
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