Technological choice under environmentalists’ participation in Emissions Trading Systems
We model competition in an emissions trading system (ETS) as a game between two firms and environmental group. In a previous stage, firms endogenously choose their manufacturing technologies. Our results show that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between how polluting the chosen technology is and the degree of the environmentalists' impure altruism. Firms choose a less polluting technology in the presence of the environmentalists than in their absence only if they are characterised by intermediate degrees of impure altruism.
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- Christoph Böhringer & Ulf Moslener & Bodo Sturm, 2007.
"Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 545-572, December.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Moslener, Ulf & Sturm, Bodo, 2006. "Hot Air for Sale: A Quantitative Assessment of Russia's Near-Term Climate Policy Options," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-16, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Bohringer, Christoph & Vogt, Carsten, 2004. "The dismantling of a breakthrough: the Kyoto Protocol as symbolic policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 597-617, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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