IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lec/leecon/09-9.html

Technological choice under environmentalists’ participation in Emissions Trading Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Elias Asproudis
  • Maria José Gil-Moltó

Abstract

We model competition in an emissions trading system (ETS) as a game between two firms and environmental group. In a previous stage, firms endogenously choose their manufacturing technologies. Our results show that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between how polluting the chosen technology is and the degree of the environmentalists' impure altruism. Firms choose a less polluting technology in the presence of the environmentalists than in their absence only if they are characterised by intermediate degrees of impure altruism.

Suggested Citation

  • Elias Asproudis & Maria José Gil-Moltó, 2009. "Technological choice under environmentalists’ participation in Emissions Trading Systems," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/9, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    • Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:09/9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp09-9.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christoph Böhringer & Ulf Moslener & Bodo Sturm, 2007. "Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 545-572, December.
    2. Bohringer, Christoph & Vogt, Carsten, 2004. "The dismantling of a breakthrough: the Kyoto Protocol as symbolic policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 597-617, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maria J. Gil-Molto & Bouwe Dijkstra, 2011. "Strictness of Environmental Policy and Investment in Abatement," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    2. Asproudis, Elias, 2011. "Trade union structure with environmental concern and firms' technological choice," MPRA Paper 28767, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007. "Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March.
    2. Dellink, Rob & Finus, Michael, 2012. "Uncertainty and climate treaties: Does ignorance pay?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 565-584.
    3. Joseph Anthony L. Reyes, 2021. "How Different Are the Nordics? Unravelling the Willingness to Make Economic Sacrifices for the Environment," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-31, January.
    4. Böhringer, Christoph & Helm, Carsten & Schürer, Laura, 2025. "How to boost countries’ climate ambitions: Turning gains from emissions trading into gains for climate," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    5. Max Meulemann, 2017. "An Empirical Assessment Of Components Of Climate Architectures," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(04), pages 1-36, November.
    6. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, August.
    7. Buob, Seraina & Stephan, Gunter, 2011. "To mitigate or to adapt: How to confront global climate change," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-16, March.
    8. Bednar-Friedl, Birgit & Farmer, Karl, 2010. "External balance, dynamic efficiency, and the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in interdependent economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 980-990, September.
    9. Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, 2013. "Political barriers of implementing carbon markets in Japan: A Public Choice analysis and the empirical evidence before and after the Fukushima nuclear disaster," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(2), pages 211-235, April.
    10. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Moslener, Ulf, 2007. "Macroeconomic Impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism: The Role of Investment Barriers and Regulations," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-026, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Jotzo, Frank & Betz, Regina, 2009. "Linking the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme," Research Reports 94814, Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub.
    12. Peymaneh Safaynikoo & Mohammad Hossein Dehghani, 2021. "Impact of international lobby groups on international environmental agreements," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 23(2), pages 441-466, April.
    13. N. Anger & B. Brouns & J. Onigkeit, 2009. "Linking the EU emissions trading scheme: economic implications of allowance allocation and global carbon constraints," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 379-398, June.
    14. Andrea Kollmann & Friedrich Schneider, 2010. "Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 2(12), pages 1-25, November.
    15. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2007. "On the importance of equity in international climate policy: An empirical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 545-562, May.
    16. Aurélie Slechten & Vincenzo Verardi, 2016. "Measuring the Impact of Multiple Air Pollution Agreements on Global CO2 Emissions," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 92(3), pages 534-554.
    17. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
    18. Larson, Donald F. & Ambrosi, Philippe & Dinar, Ariel & Rahman, Shaikh Mahfuzur & Entler, Rebecca, 2008. "Carbon markets, institutions, policies, and research," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4761, The World Bank.
    19. Martin Kesternich, 2016. "Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements: empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(12), pages 1047-1065, March.
    20. Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, 2011. "Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor's Orders? Mostly no! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan before and after the Earthquake," CESifo Working Paper Series 3639, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:09/9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Abbie Sleath (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deleiuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.