Did the Maastricht treaty matter for macroeconomic performance?
We explore the impact of the Maastricht treaty on fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes in the EU with the difference-in-difference methodology. Our dataset covers 23 OECD countries over the 1975-2006 period. EU 15 countries are classified as the treatment and eight non-EU OECD countries as the control group. The results indicate that the provisions in the Maastricht treaty have been either irrelevant or even harmful for fiscal and macroeconomic developments in the EU. Evidence for a detrimental impact of the Maastricht criteria is particularly strong for the period after the start of the third stage of EMU
|Date of creation:||2009|
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|Publication status:||Published in Kyklos 3.62(2009): pp. 331-358|
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