Intertemporal Choice: A Nash Bargaining Approach
A compelling, but highly tractable, axiomatic foundation for intertemporal decision making is established and discussed. This axiomatic foundation relies on methods employed in cooperative bargaining theory. Four simple axioms imply that the intertemporal objective function is a weighted geometric average of each period's utility function. This is in contrast to standard practice, which takes the objective function to be a weighted arithmetic average. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time.
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- Emmanuel De Veirman & Ashley Dunstan, 2008. "How do Housing Wealth, Financial Wealth and Consumption Interact? Evidence from New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP2008/05, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
- Grant Scobie & Trinh Le & John Gibson, 2007. "Housing in the Household Portfolio and Implications for Retirement Saving: Some Initial Finding from SOFIE," Treasury Working Paper Series 07/04, New Zealand Treasury.
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