Sharing a risky cake
Consider an n-person bargaining problem where players bargain over the division of a cake whose size is stochastic. In such a game, the players are not only bargaining over the division of a cake, but they are also sharing risk. This paper presents the Nash bargaining solution to this problem, investigates its properties, and highlights a few special cases.
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- Grant Scobie & Trinh Le & John Gibson, 2007. "Housing in the Household Portfolio and Implications for Retirement Saving: Some Initial Finding from SOFIE," Treasury Working Paper Series 07/04, New Zealand Treasury.
- Emmanuel De Veirman & Ashley Dunstan, 2008. "How do Housing Wealth, Financial Wealth and Consumption Interact? Evidence from New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP2008/05, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
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