Wage Bargaining and Employer Objectives
This paper compares union wage bargaining outcomes across different types of employers. Five different employer objectives are discussed; profit–, welfare– and output maximization, and two specifications of a Leviathan. The model shows that the ordering of the union wage level across employer types depends on the functional form of product demand. With constant elasticity of product demand, the wage tends to be lowest in the output maximization case, while with a linear product demand, the wage tends to be lowest under welfare maximization.
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- Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Joshua L. Schwarz, 1983.
"Public Sector Labor Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
1179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Maria Paz Espinosa & Changyong Rhee, 1989. "Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 565-588.
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