Wage Bargaining and Employer Objectives
This paper compares union wage bargaining outcomes across different types of employers. Five different employer objectives are discussed: profit, welfare and output maximization, and two specifications of a Leviathan. The model shows that the ordering of the union wage level across employer types depends on the functional form of product demand. With constant elasticity of product demand wage tends to be lowest in the output maximization case, while with a linear product demand wage tends to be lowest under welfare maximization. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2004.
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Volume (Year): 72 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (07)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Booth, Alison L, 1984. "A Public Choice Model of Trade Union Behaviour and Membership," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 883-98, December.
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- Carruth, Alan A & Oswald, Andrew J, 1987. "On Union Preferences and Labour Market Models: Insiders and Outsi ders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 431-45, June.
- Babcock, Linda C & Engberg, John & Glazer, Amihai, 1997. "Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 532-43, July.
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