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Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

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  • Arun G. Chandrasekhar
  • Horacio Larreguy
  • Juan Pablo Xandri

Abstract

Agents often use noisy signals from their neighbors to update their beliefs about a state of the world. The effectiveness of social learning relies on the details of how agents aggregate information from others. There are two prominent models of information aggregation in networks: (1) Bayesian learning, where agents use Bayes' rule to assess the state of the world and (2) DeGroot learning, where agents instead consider a weighted average of their neighbors' previous period opinions or actions. Agents who engage in DeGroot learning often double-count information and may not converge in the long run. We conduct a lab experiment in the field with 665 subjects across 19 villages in Karnataka, India, designed to structurally test which model best describes social learning. Seven subjects were placed into a network with common knowledge of the network structure. Subjects attempted to learn the underlying (binary) state of the world, having received independent identically distributed signals in the first period. Thereafter, in each period, subjects made guesses about the state of the world, and these guesses were transmitted to their neighbors at the beginning of the following round. We structurally estimate a model of Bayesian learning, relaxing common knowledge of Bayesian rationality by allowing agents to have incomplete information as to whether others are Bayesian or DeGroot. Our estimates show that, despite the flexibility in modeling learning in these networks, agents are robustly best described by DeGroot-learning models wherein they take a simple majority of previous guesses in their neighborhood.

Suggested Citation

  • Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Horacio Larreguy & Juan Pablo Xandri, 2015. "Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field," NBER Working Papers 21468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21468
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    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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    7. Gerry Tsoukalas & Brett Hemenway Falk, 2020. "Token-Weighted Crowdsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 3843-3859, September.
    8. Beaman, Lori & Dillon, Andrew, 2018. "Diffusion of agricultural information within social networks: Evidence on gender inequalities from Mali," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 147-161.
    9. Zakharov, Alexei & Bondarenko, Oxana, 2021. "Social status and social learning," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    10. Berno Buechel & Stefan Klößner & Martin Lochmüller & Heiko Rauhut, 2020. "The strength of weak leaders: an experiment on social influence and social learning in teams," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 259-293, June.
    11. David B. Johnson & Matthew D. Webb, 2017. "An Experimental Test of the No Safety Schools Theorem," Carleton Economic Papers 17-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    12. Akylai Taalaibekova, 2018. "Opinion formation in social networks," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 28(2), pages 85-108.
    13. Francesco Drago & Friederike Mengel & Christian Traxler, 2020. "Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 96-133, April.
    14. Vincent Boucher & Finagnon A. Dedewanou & Arnaud Dufays, 2018. "Peer-Induced Beliefs Regarding College Participation," Cahiers de recherche 1817, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    15. Phillip Monin & Richard Bookstaber, 2017. "Information Flows, the Accuracy of Opinions, and Crashes in a Dynamic Network," Staff Discussion Papers 17-01, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    16. Celhay, Pablo & Meyer, Bruce D. & Mittag, Nikolas, 2022. "Stigma in Welfare Programs," IZA Discussion Papers 15431, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Ionel Popescu & Tushar Vaidya, 2019. "Averaging plus Learning Models and Their Asymptotics," Papers 1904.08131, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    18. Szeidl, Adam & Mobius, Markus & Phan, Tuan, 2015. "Treasure Hunt: Social Learning in the Field," CEPR Discussion Papers 10493, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Ouedraogo, Aissatou & Dillon, Andrew & Maiga, Eugenie W.H., 2018. "Social networks, production of micronutrient-rich foods, and child health outcomes in Burkina Faso," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 273883, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Tushar Vaidya & Thiparat Chotibut & Georgios Piliouras, 2019. "Broken Detailed Balance and Non-Equilibrium Dynamics in Noisy Social Learning Models," Papers 1906.11481, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
    21. Zenou, Yves & Jackson, Matthew O. & Rogers, Brian, 2016. "Networks: An economic perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11452, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    23. Friederike Mengel, 2021. "Gender Bias In Opinion Aggregation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1055-1080, August.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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