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Oil and Democracy in Russia

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  • Daniel Treisman

Abstract

Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called "resource curse"--the argument that natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining various data, I show that such fears are exaggerated. Evidence from around the world suggests that for countries like Russia with an established oil industry, even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect on the political regime. In addition, Russia--a country with an industrialized economy, a highly educated, urbanized population, and an oil sector that remains majority private-owned--is unlikely to be susceptible to most of the hypothesized pernicious effects of resource dependence.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Treisman, 2010. "Oil and Democracy in Russia," NBER Working Papers 15667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15667
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David S. Jacks & Kevin H. O'Rourke & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2011. "Commodity Price Volatility and World Market Integration since 1700," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 800-813, August.
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    4. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Income and Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-842, June.
    5. Silje Aslaksen, 2010. "Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(4), pages 421-431, July.
    6. World Bank, 2009. "World Development Indicators 2009," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 4367.
    7. Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin & Anton Kolotilin, 2007. "Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," Working Papers w0115, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    8. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    9. Egorov, Georgy & Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 645-668, November.
    10. Beck, Roland & Kamps, Annette & Mileva, Elitza, 2007. "Long-term growth prospects for the Russian economy," Occasional Paper Series 58, European Central Bank.
    11. Suni, Paavo, 2007. "Oil Prices and the Russian Economy. Some Simulation Studies with NiGEM," Discussion Papers 1088, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barrak Algharabali & J. S. Butler & Stacy Closson, 2021. "The Oil Curse Validated: Evidence from Eurasia and Latin America," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 11(3), pages 494-501.
    2. Art Durnev & Sergei Guriev, 2007. "The Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel," Working Papers w0108, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    3. Andrei Melville & Mikhail Mironyuk & Denis Stukal, 2012. "Trajectories of Regime Transformation and Types of Stateness in Post-Communist Countries," HSE Working papers WP BRP 02/PS/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    4. Brieger Stefan & Markwardt Gunther, 2020. "The Democracy–Economy-Nexus," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 71(2), pages 135-167, August.
    5. Akif Bahadir Kaynak, 2016. "The Impact of Resource Rents on the Foreign Policymaking in West Asia," International Studies, , vol. 53(2), pages 105-117, April.
    6. Libman, Alexander, 2010. "Subnational resource curse: do economic or political institutions matter?," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 154, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    7. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5um2bhne3f862raaulvoogm15e is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Selahmi, Basma & Liu, Chunping, 2022. "Institutions and the Resource Curse in GCC countries," MPRA Paper 114924, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Aug 2022.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5um2bhne3f862raaulvoogm15e is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-

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