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Working Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Anna Zaharieva (Chizhova)

    () (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

This paper considers job separations in a search model with labour market matching and moral hazard. Both workers and firms value productive matches and take actions to increase match stability: firms offer a share of match surplus to provide workers with correct incentives and workers take hidden actions (effort) negatively affecting the match separation rate. Heterogeneous productivity draws combined with the moral hazard problem give rise to match-specific endogenous separation rates. Additionally a counteraction of two effects - match stability and match scarcity - explains an observed asymmetric shape of a wage probability density function with a unique interior mode on the support.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Zaharieva (Chizhova), 2010. "Working Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibrium," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2010-06, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  • Handle: RePEc:knz:dpteco:1006
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    File URL: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_Zaharieva-6-10.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Stupnytska, Yuliia, 2015. "Asymmetric information in a search model with social contacts," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 548, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Martin, Christopher, 2015. "Search Frictions, Efficiency Wages and Equilibrium Unemployment," Department of Economics Working Papers 45163, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    3. Dennis Wesselbaum, 2013. "Reciprocity and matching frictions," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(3), pages 247-268, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; separation rate; job stability; effort; wage density;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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