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Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance

Listed author(s):
  • Gibbs, Michael

    ()

    (University of Chicago)

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, which provides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use the lessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance in practice.

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File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6322.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 6322.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Publication status: published in: C. R. Thomas and W. F. Shughart II (eds.), Oxford Handbook in Managerial Economics, Oxford University Press, 2013, 397-423
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6322
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  1. Randolph Sloof & Mirjam Praag, 2015. "Testing for Distortions in Performance Measures: An Application to Residual Income-Based Measures like Economic Value Added," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 74-91, 03.
  2. Cindy Zoghi & Alec Levenson & Michael Gibbs, 2005. "Why Are Jobs Designed the Way They Are?," Working Papers 382, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  3. Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, 2004. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 23-56, January.
  4. Levenson, Alec R. & Zoghi, Cindy & Gibbs, Michael & Benson, George, 2011. "Optimizing Incentive Plan Design: A Case Study," IZA Discussion Papers 5985, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, 2008. "A General Test for Distortions in Performance Measures," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 428-441, August.
  6. repec:bla:joares:v:27:y:1989:i:1:p:21-39 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Srikant Datar & Susan Cohen Kulp & Richard A. Lambert, 2001. "Balancing Performance Measures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 75-92, 06.
  8. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
  9. Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The benefits of limited feedback in organizations," Economics Working Papers 1232, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  10. Jed Devaro & Fidan Ana Kurtulus, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(4), pages 641-661, July.
  11. repec:eme:rleczz:s0147-9121(2010)0000030007 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
  13. John F. Helliwell & Haifang Huang, 2010. "How's the Job? Well-Being and Social Capital in the Workplace," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(2), pages 205-227, January.
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