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Other-Regarding Preferences and Leadership Styles

Author

Listed:
  • Kocher, Martin G.

    () (University of Munich)

  • Pogrebna, Ganna

    () (University of Warwick)

  • Sutter, Matthias

    () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether and to what extent other-regarding preferences of team leaders influence their leadership style in choice under risk. We find that leaders who prefer efficiency or report high levels of selfishness are more likely to exercise an autocratic leadership style by ignoring preferences of the other team members. Yet, inequity aversion has no significant impact on leadership styles. Elected leaders have a higher propensity than exogenously assigned leaders to use a democratic leadership style by reaching team consensus. Male leaders and leaders influenced by group membership tend to employ a democratic leadership style.

Suggested Citation

  • Kocher, Martin G. & Pogrebna, Ganna & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "Other-Regarding Preferences and Leadership Styles," IZA Discussion Papers 4080, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4080
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Na liderança, mulheres são menos democráticas do que homens
      by Thiago Perin in Ciência Maluca on 2010-09-02 18:00:05

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emrah Arbak & Marie Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary Leadership: Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00664830, HAL.
    2. Seda Ertac & Mehmet Y. Gurdal, 2013. "Preference Communication and Leadership in Group Decision-Making," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1324, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    3. Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 635-662, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    other-regarding preferences; unobserved heterogeneity; leadership style;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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