IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Product Markets and Paychecks: Deregulation's Effect on the Compensation Structure in Banking

  • Wozniak, Abigail


    (University of Notre Dame)

This paper asks how deregulation intended to promote competition in the commercial banking industry affected the compensation structure for banking employees. Using establishment-based data from the Employment Cost Index Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, I obtain measures of the level and distribution of wage and benefits compensation within industries. I then compare changes in compensation in the banking industry to changes in unaffected industries across states and over time to identify the effects of deregulation. Banking deregulation had no effect on compensation levels or inequality in the industry as a whole, but this masks conflicting changes within the compensation structure. Manager wages fell while non-manager wages held steady, leading to a large decline in between-occupation compensation inequality. In contrast, between-establishment inequality increased dramatically. Deregulation also led to increases in inequality among managers despite their falling wages and to significant shifts in the types of non-wage benefits banking employees received.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1957.

in new window

Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2007, 60 (2), 246-267
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1957
Contact details of provider: Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page:

Order Information: Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Nicholas Economides & R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1995. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," NBER Working Papers 5210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. repec:oup:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:4:p:1437-1467 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," NBER Working Papers 5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. repec:oup:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:3:p:869-84 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1777, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Sandra A. Cannon & Bruce C. Fallick & Michael Lettau & Raven E. Saks, 2000. "Has compensation become more flexible?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-27, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks," NBER Working Papers 8752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, 2002. "Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 9110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. David Card, 1996. "Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline Industry," NBER Working Papers 5687, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. repec:oup:qjecon:v:116:y:2001:i:4:p:1493-1525 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Brown, Charles & Medoff, James, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1027-59, October.
  12. Rose, Nancy L, 1987. "Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1146-78, December.
  13. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring.
  14. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  15. Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1995. "Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 105-130, September.
  16. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
  17. Nicole M. Fortin & Thomas Lemieux, 1997. "Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality: Is There a Linkage?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 75-96, Spring.
  18. James Peoples, 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 111-130, Summer.
  19. Sandra E. Black & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 814-831, September.
  20. repec:oup:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:3:p:639-70 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Flannery, Mark J., 1984. "The social costs of unit banking restrictions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 237-249, March.
  22. Kane, Edward J, 1996. "De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 141-61, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1957. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.