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Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment

Listed author(s):
  • Koskela, Erkki

    ()

    (University of Helsinki)

  • Stenbacka, Rune

    ()

    (Swedish School of Economics)

Registered author(s):

    We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strong and benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.

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    File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp1020.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1020.

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    Length: 36 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2004
    Publication status: published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004, 106 (4), 677-701
    Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1020
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