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Are Nash Bargaining Wage Agreements Unique? An Investigation into Bargaining Sets for Firm-Union Negotiations

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  • Alexander, C O
  • Ledermann, W

Abstract

The shapes of the bargaining sets for firm-union negotiations are rigorously analyzed in two cases, according to whether bargaining is over wages alone (with employment set according to the labor demand schedule) or over both wages and employment. When bargaining concerns wages only, the bargaining set becomes a one-dimensional curve and so the standard theory of the Nash bargaining solution does not apply. Therefore, existence and uniqueness conditions are proved directly. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is also analyzed and results are illustrated using a constant elasticity example. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Alexander, C O & Ledermann, W, 1996. "Are Nash Bargaining Wage Agreements Unique? An Investigation into Bargaining Sets for Firm-Union Negotiations," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 242-253, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:2:p:242-53
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    Cited by:

    1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2020. "Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 8422, CESifo.
    2. Claus-Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2019. "The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets," Working Papers CIE 128, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    3. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2004. "Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 677-701, December.
    4. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2018. "Union–Firm Bargaining Agenda Revisited: When Unions Have Distinct Preferences," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 35-50, January.
    5. Harbaugh, Rick, 2005. "The effect of employee stock ownership on wage and employment bargaining," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 565-583, September.
    6. Claus‐Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2023. "Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 403-440, April.
    7. L. Monroy & V. Rubiales & A. M. Mármol, 2017. "The conservative Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for multiple scenario bargaining," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 251(1), pages 285-299, April.

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