IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/isu/genstf/201401010800005236.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Three essays on consumer choices on food

Author

Listed:
  • Oh, Miyoung

Abstract

The dissertation investigates how consumer choices on food are affected by habit forming behaviors of consumers, public policy and the uncertainty of the risk from food safety hazards and strategic interaction with food processors. Three stand-alone analyses on consumer choice consist of empirical frameworks to estimate parameters of dynamic demand, the treatment effects on program participation, and an analytical approach to modeling downstream consumer's and upstream firm's handling of food safety risk.The first analysis focuses on dynamics in household demand. Incorporating dynamics such as habit formation in analysis of food demand can make estimation more reliable and help to explain the "stickiness" in consumer demand behavior. Capturing this response is important for evaluating consumers' response to new information about products - whether nutrition, food safety or other event. Scanner data allow many repeated observations of the same household so are ideal for analyzing the impact of habit on food demand. In addition to that, scanner data allow us to easily observe the presence of zero purchases. The presence of zero purchases is an important econometric issue in empirical modeling on food demand in the sense that ignoring the censoring issue can lead to biased estimation results. The first study investigates the impact of state dependence on dairy food demand using 2009 and 2010 Nielsen HomeScan data. In this analysis, we take into account the censored nature of food expenditure data and employ a Bayesian procedure to estimate the dynamic demand models on dairy products. By controlling the individual heterogeneity in the model the source of endogeneity for the lagged dependent variable is removed. The empirical evidence of habitual behaviors particularly in milk demand provides support for considering a model with dynamics in a study of food demand.The second analysis examines the relationship between The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) participation and purchases of WIC related foods during the period shortly after introduction of changes in the WIC package. We use Nielsen Homescan data 2008 to 2010to assess how participation in the WIC program relates to food expenditures by WIC eligible households. The research includes analysis of select food purchases by WIC eligible households - both of those reporting participation in the WIC program and those not participating in the program. In our analysis, we concentrate our attention on selected whole grain foods in the WIC food package as these foods are prominent in the revised WIC food package and grain products are purchased by most households. A propensity score matching estimator was used for estimating treatment effects and difference-in-difference method was conducted to control the policy change in the 2009 WIC package revision. The study contributes to current literature on WIC to confirm that the WIC package change in 2009 had a significant influence on WIC participating households to encourage greater whole grain expenditures relative to non-participating households.The third analysis concerns the uncertainty of the risk from food safety hazards and strategic interaction with food processors. Domestic water consumers in many developing countries that boil water before use are presumably concerned about quality control on the part of upstream water authorities. In this third analysis, we investigate strategic incentives for food safety efforts by upstream food processors and downstream consumers. The strategic setting is where food processors move first and consumers react to perceptions about processor behavior. We consider two technological environments in which food safety is assured: i) weakest-link where both processor and consumer behavior must succeed; ii) best-shot where it suffices for efforts by either party to succeed. We study privately optimal behavior under negligence and strict liability rules, and also investigate the role of consumer risk aversion.

Suggested Citation

  • Oh, Miyoung, 2014. "Three essays on consumer choices on food," ISU General Staff Papers 201401010800005236, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:201401010800005236
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/fec907a2-2aa9-4e35-a04c-788f9273bc59/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2006. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 217-241, Springer.
    2. Godwin, Sandria L. & Coppings, R.J., 2005. "Analysis of Consumer Food-Handling Practices from Grocer to Home Including Transport and Storage of Selected Foods," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 36(1), pages 1-8, March.
    3. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 1999. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 24(1), pages 19-28, June.
    4. Rouvière, Elodie & Caswell, Julie A., 2012. "From punishment to prevention: A French case study of the introduction of co-regulation in enforcing food safety," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 246-254.
    5. Kivi, Paul A. & Shogren, Jason F., 2010. "Second-Order Ambiguity in Very Low Probability Risks: Food Safety Valuation," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1-14, December.
    6. Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 39-42.
    7. Tore Ellingsen & Robert Östling, 2010. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1695-1724, September.
    8. Jason Shogren & Thomas Crocker, 1991. "Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 195-214, June.
    9. Choi, E. Kwan & Jensen, Helen H., 1991. "Modeling the Effect of Risk on Food Demand and the Implications for Regulation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 468, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. David A. Hennessy & Jutta Roosen & John A. Miranowski, 2001. "Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 862-874.
    11. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    12. Shogren, Jason F, 1990. "The Impact of Self-protection and Self-insurance on Individual Response to Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 191-204, June.
    13. Brian Roe, 2004. "Optimal Sharing of Foodborne Illness Prevention between Consumers and Industry: The Effect of Regulation and Liability," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(2), pages 359-374.
    14. H. Frederick Gale & Dinghuan Hu, 2012. "Food Safety Pressures Push Integration in China's Agricultural Sector," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(2), pages 483-488.
    15. Lee, Kangoh, 2012. "Background risk and self-protection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 262-264.
    16. Elamin H. Elbasha* & T. Lynn Riggs, 2003. "The effects of information on producer and consumer incentives to undertake food safety efforts: A theoretical model and policy implications," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 29-42.
    17. Piggott, Nicholas E. & Taylor, Mykel R. & Kuchler, Fred, 2007. "The Impacts of Food Safety Information on Meat Demand: A Cross-Commodity Approach Using U.S. Household Data," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon 9752, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    18. Klaus G. Grunert, 2005. "Food quality and safety: consumer perception and demand," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 32(3), pages 369-391, September.
    19. Buzby, Jean C. & Frenzen, Paul D., 1999. "Food safety and product liability," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 637-651, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Methaq Ahmed Sallam, 2016. "The Impact of Brand Image and Corporate Branding on Consumer¡¯s Choice: The Role of Brand Equity," International Journal of Marketing Studies, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(1), pages 98-106, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yuqing Zheng & Chen Zhen & Daniel Dench & James M. Nonnemaker, 2017. "U.S. Demand for Tobacco Products in a System Framework," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(8), pages 1067-1086, August.
    2. Oh, Miyoung & Hennessy, David A., 2014. "Upstream and Downstream Strategic Food Safety Interactions," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 174105, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Xue, Minggao & Cheng, Wen, 2013. "Background risk, bivariate risk attitudes, and optimal prevention," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 390-395.
    4. E. Rouvière & K. Latouche, 2014. "Impact of liability rules on modes of coordination for food safety in supply chains," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 111-130, February.
    5. Courbage, Christophe & Rey, Béatrice, 2012. "Optimal prevention and other risks in a two-period model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 213-217.
    6. Jindapon, Paan, 2013. "Do risk lovers invest in self-protection?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 290-293.
    7. Dionne, Georges & Li, Jingyuan, 2011. "The impact of prudence on optimal prevention revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 147-149.
    8. Christophe Courbage & Henri Loubergé & Richard Peter, 2017. "Optimal Prevention for Multiple Risks," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(3), pages 899-922, September.
    9. Huang, Rachel J., 2012. "Ambiguity aversion, higher-order risk attitude and optimal effort," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 338-345.
    10. Menegatti, Mario, 2009. "Optimal prevention and prudence in a two-period model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 393-397, November.
    11. Benoît Sévi & Fabrice Yafil, 2005. "A special case of self-protection: The choice of a lawyer," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(6), pages 1-8.
    12. Donald Meyer & Jack Meyer, 2011. "A Diamond-Stiglitz approach to the demand for self-protection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 45-60, February.
    13. Jiazhen Peng & Xiaojun Shan & Yang Gao & Yohannes Kesete & Rachel Davidson & Linda Nozick & Jamie Kruse, 2014. "Modeling the integrated roles of insurance and retrofit in managing natural disaster risk: a multi-stakeholder perspective," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 74(2), pages 1043-1068, November.
    14. Kangoh Lee, 2005. "Wealth Effects on Self-Insurance and Self-Protection against Monetary and Nonmonetary Losses," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(2), pages 147-159, December.
    15. Menegatti, Mario & Rebessi, Filippo, 2011. "On the substitution between saving and prevention," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 176-182.
    16. Chuang, O-Chia & Eeckhoudt, Louis & Huang, Rachel J. & Tzeng, Larry Y., 2013. "Risky targets and effort," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 465-468.
    17. Courbage, Christophe & Rey, Béatrice & Treich, Nicolas, 2013. "Prevention and precaution," TSE Working Papers 13-445, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    18. Berger, Loïc & Bosetti, Valentina, 2020. "Characterizing ambiguity attitudes using model uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 621-637.
    19. Huang, Yi-Chieh & Tzeng, Larry Y. & Zhao, Lin, 2015. "Comparative ambiguity aversion and downside ambiguity aversion," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 257-269.
    20. Crainich, David & Eeckhoudt, Louis & Menegatti, Mario, 2016. "Changing risks and optimal effort," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 97-106.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:201401010800005236. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Curtis Balmer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.