IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/2014-033.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Commodity Price Shocks and Imperfectly Credible Macroeconomic Policies in Commodity-Exporting Small Open Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pablo Medina Guzman
  • Claudia Soto

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how lack of credibility and transparency of monetary and fiscal policies undermines the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies to isolate the economy from commodity price fluctuations. We develop a general equilibrium model for a commodity-exporting economy where macro policies are conducted through rules. We show that the responses of output, aggregate demand, and inflation to an increase in commodity price are magnified when these rules are imperfectly credible and lack transparency. If policies are imperfectly credible, then transparency helps private agents to learn the systematic behavior of the autorities, reducing the effects of commodity prices shocks. Coherent with the model, we show cross-country evidence that monetary policy transparency and fiscal credibility reduce the incidence of export price volatility on output volatility. Also, our results indicate that having an explicit fiscal rule and an inflation targeting regime contribute to isolate the economy from terms of trade fluctuations.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pablo Medina Guzman & Claudia Soto, 2014. "Commodity Price Shocks and Imperfectly Credible Macroeconomic Policies in Commodity-Exporting Small Open Economies," IMF Working Papers 2014/033, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2014/033
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41351
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2007. "Central Bank transparency in theory and practice," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 760-789, December.
    2. Olivier J. Blanchard & Marianna Riggi, 2013. "WHY ARE THE 2000s SO DIFFERENT FROM THE 1970s? A STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION OF CHANGES IN THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OIL PRICES," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(5), pages 1032-1052, October.
    3. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2003. "Closing small open economy models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 163-185, October.
    4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    5. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408.
    6. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
    7. Aizenman, Joshua & Hutchison, Michael & Noy, Ilan, 2011. "Inflation Targeting and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging Markets," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 712-724, May.
    8. Refet S. Gürkaynak & Andrew T. Levin & Andrew N. Marder & Eric T. Swanson, 2007. "Inflation Targeting and the Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Western Hemisphere," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 11, pages 415-465, Central Bank of Chile.
    9. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis & Justin Wolfers, 2004. "Disagreement about Inflation Expectations," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 209-270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Juan Pablo Medina & Claudio Soto, 2007. "Copper Price, Fiscal Policu and Business Cycle in Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 458, Central Bank of Chile.
    11. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    12. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. International Monetary Fund, 2005. "Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes," IMF Working Papers 2005/225, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March.
    15. Erceg, Christopher J. & Henderson, Dale W. & Levin, Andrew T., 2000. "Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 281-313, October.
    16. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    17. Fabian Bornhorst & Annalisa Fedelino & Jan Gottschalk & Gabriela Dobrescu, 2011. "When and How to Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle? A Guide to Structural Fiscal Balances," IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 11/02, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Fabian Bornhorst & Ms. Annalisa Fedelino & Jan Gottschalk & Miss Gabriela Dobrescu, 2011. "When and How to Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle? A Guide to Structural Fiscal Balances," IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 2011/002, International Monetary Fund.
    19. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ouedraogo, Rasmane & Sourouema, Windemanegda Sandrine, 2018. "Fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in Sub-Saharan African countries: The role of export concentration," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 219-229.
    2. Mohn, Klaus, 2016. "Resource revenue management and wealth neutrality in Norway," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 446-457.
    3. UNDP Africa, 2016. "Primary Commodity Booms and Busts Emerging Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa," UNDP Africa Reports 267623, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
    4. Rangan Gupta & Hylton Hollander & Rudi Steinbach, 2020. "Forecasting output growth using a DSGE-based decomposition of the South African yield curve," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 351-378, January.
    5. Mohn, Klaus, 2015. "Resource revenue management and wealth neutrality," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2015/2, University of Stavanger.
    6. Rangan Gupta & Hylton Hollander & Mark E. Wohar, 2016. "The Impact of Oil Shocks in a Small Open Economy New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model for South Africa," Working Papers 201652, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    3. Taniya Ghosh & Yadavindu Ajit, 2023. "Central bank transparency, the role of institutions and inflation persistence," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2023-012, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    4. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Cuitiño, María Fernanda & Medina, Juan Pablo & Zacheo, Laura, 2022. "Conditional exchange rate pass-through and monetary policy credibility: Insights from Uruguay and Chile," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    6. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Fernanda Cuitiño & Juan Pablo Medina & Laura Zacheo, 2021. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through Conditional on Shocks and Monetary Policy Credibility. The Case of Uruguay," Documentos de trabajo 2021008, Banco Central del Uruguay.
    8. Ondra Kamenik & Michael Kumhof, 2014. "Trade Openness and Exchange Rate Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(8), pages 1657-1686, December.
    9. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and macroeconomics," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 373-383.
    10. Man-Keung Tang & Mr. Xiangrong Yu, 2011. "Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics," IMF Working Papers 2011/209, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Ma, Yong & Li, Shushu, 2015. "Bayesian estimation of China's monetary policy transparency: A New Keynesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 236-248.
    12. Thorvardur Tjörvi Ólafsson, 2006. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: In Search of Improvements and Adaptation to the Open Economy," Economics wp31_tjorvi, Department of Economics, Central bank of Iceland.
    13. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
    15. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    16. Zsolt Darvas & Valentina Kostyleva, 2011. "Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 147-185.
    17. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    18. Christoph Himmels & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2009. "The interest rate - exchange rate nexus: exchange rate regimes and policy equilibria," Discussion Papers 0904, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    19. Garcia, Carlos J. & Restrepo, Jorge E. & Tanner, Evan, 2011. "Fiscal rules in a volatile world: A welfare-based approach," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 649-676, July.
    20. Cecilia Dassatti & Gerardo Licandro, 2021. "Measuring monetary policy transparency in Uruguay," Documentos de trabajo 2021003, Banco Central del Uruguay.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2014/033. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.