Why Do Lazy People Make More Money? The Strange Case of the Public Sector Wage Premium
Empirical work suggests the presence of a public sector wage premium, the reasons for which are investigated in this paper. The results demonstrate a higher premium paid to women and premium decreases concurrent with skills. Job security undermines the incentive to work hard and forces the public sector to pay higher wages. Thus, the public sector wage premium can be used as an indicator of inefficiency in the public sector.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1300 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20577|
Web page: http://www.iadb.org/res
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holmlund, Bertil, 1993.
"Wage setting in private and public sectors in a model with endogenous government behavior,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 149-162, May.
- Holmlund, B., 1991. "Wage Setting in Private and Public Sectors in a Model with Endogenous Government Behavior," Papers 1991i, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, 1998. "Fiscal Institutions and Public Sector Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Joshua L. Schwarz, 1983.
"Public Sector Labor Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
1179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Psacharopoulos, George & Velez, Eduardo, 1992. "Schooling, Ability, and Earnings in Colombia, 1988," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(3), pages 629-43, April.
- David Blanchflower, 1996. "The Role and Influence of Trade Unions in the OECD," CEP Discussion Papers dp0310, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Quinn, Joseph F, 1982. "Pension Wealth of Government and Private Sector Workers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 283-87, May.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
- Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March.
- Beggs, John J & Chapman, Bruce J, 1988. "Labor Turnover Bias in Estimating Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(1), pages 117-23, February.
- Richard A. Ippolito, 1987. "Why Federal Workers Don't Quit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 22(2), pages 281-299.
- Michael Kremer, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-575.
- International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation; Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
- Gregory, Robert G. & Borland, Jeff, 1999. "Recent developments in public sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 3573-3630 Elsevier.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
- Dale Ballou, 1996. "Do Public Schools Hire the Best Applicants?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 97-133.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monica Bazan)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.